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In the last deades, rms have inreasingly ross-listed their shares at foreign exhanges
(see Pagano, Roell, and Zehner (2002)). This trend has been partiularly strong for the
U.S., where, at the New York Stok Exhange (NYSE) for example, the number of non-U.S.
listings quadrupled over the last deade to 467 rms at the end of 2002. They generated
approximately 10% of total volume that year.
1
The NASDAQ lists even more non-U.S.
rms. Further international evidene is, for example, the large number of non-domesti
stoks that are traded on European exhanges, up to 50% for the exhanges in Amsterdam,
Brussels, Frankfurt, and Switzerland (see Pagano et al. (2001)). This trend has prompted
many aademi studies. Most of them fous on the benets of ross-listings, suh as redued
ost of apital and enhaned liquidity of a rm's stok.
2
Relatively unexplored is trading in the fragmented market after the ross-listing.
Most lassi paradigms in mirostruture fous on entralized markets, whih is justied by
the ommon belief that markets tend to onsolidate. The inrease in fragmented trading,
however, triggered theorists to prove that a fragmented market an exist as an equilib-
rium (see, e.g., Pagano (1989), Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), Biais (1993), Bernhardt and
Hughson (1997), Biais, Martimort, and Rohet (2000), de Frutos and Manzano (2002), Yin
(2004)). The model developed in Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) appears to be most suitable
for ross-listed seurities, as it assumes all markets have an idiosynrati pool of traders, who
only trade loally for exogenous reasons. Sophistiated investors benet by splitting orders
aross markets. In equilibrium, wealth is transferred from loal to sophistiated investors,
sine loal investors are shown to be better o in a single, entralized market. Moreover,
Fouault and Gehrig (2002) prove that this equilibrium might emerge endogenously, sine
issuers benet from the inreased informational eÆieny of a fragmented market. This en-
ables them to make better investment deisions (see, e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999)).
Our objetive is to test whether (sophistiated) investors split orders in real world
1
See the on-line NYSE fatbook (www.nysedata.om).
2
See, e.g., Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan(1987, 1988), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Karolyi (1998),
Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998), and Miller (1999).
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markets and how this aets the trading proess. We study a natural experiment of over-
lapping markets, so that the non-overlap serves as a benhmark period. This is an ideal
laboratory, sine, if order-splitting really benets sophistiated investors and if they an
time their trades, they might want to onentrate their orders in the overlap. These no-
tions are formalized and tested and we see three areas where the paper ontributes to the
literature.
First, we tailor the Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) model to overlapping markets and
extend it by allowing sophistiated traders to time their trades as in Admati and Peiderer
(1988). We show that onentrated trading in the overlap is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
it is the Nash equilibrium with lowest ost for sophistiated traders and, under fairly mild
onditions, the only Nash equilibrium. And, we nd analyti expressions for volume, whih
are absent in Chowdhry and Nanda (1991). In a stepwise approah from fully segmented
markets to markets with maximum hoie for traders, referred to as the full-edged model,
we develop intraday patterns in volatility, volume, and market depth. Although the existing
literature oers an exellent intuition for these patterns, it laks a model to formalize it (see,
e.g., Werner and Kleidon (1996), Hupperets and Menkveld (2002)).
Seond, in addition to studying intraday patterns, we develop a diret test for order-
splitting through a high-frequeny analysis of order imbalane in the overlap. The model
distinguishes two types of traders who split orders: (i) informed traders who maximize
prot and exploit their private signal on the true value of the seurity by trading in eah
market and (ii) large liquidity traders who have to trade an exogenous number of shares
and minimize ost by splitting the order optimally aross markets. Either way, these traders
trade in the same diretion and their ativity should show through positive orrelation in
order imbalane, dened as buy volume minus sell volume in a ve-minute time interval. In
hunting for suh a footprint in the data, we have to ontrol for three eets. First, we ontrol
for potential arbitrage trading as it auses negative orrelation in order imbalane. Seond,
we ontrol for the positive orrelation that is due to arrival of new (private) information in
both markets. Third, we ontrol for \mirostruture" dynamis in order imbalane due to,
2
for example, program trading or inventory management by liquidity suppliers.
Third, we explore the natural experiment of British and Duth seurities that are
ross-listed at the NYSE. The main attrations of this experiment are (i) a non-overlapping
period that serves as a benhmark period and (ii) signiant trading in both markets, whih
reates optimal onditions for the order-splitting predited by the model. It, therefore,
ompares partiularly well with another natural andidate: fragmented trading on the NYSE
and the U.S. regional exhanges. For this pure U.S. experiment, the non-overlap is either
small or non-existent and trading at the regional exhanges is signiantly less liquid.
3
For
our set of seurities, the NYSE generates up to a third of total volume in the overlap on
omparable, if not better, spreads. In 2002, trading in British and Duth stoks generated
roughly 50% of \European" volume in New York, whih, in turn, represents 50% of non-U.S.
volume at the NYSE.
4
Werner and Kleidon (1996) are the rst to doument intraday trading
patterns for ross-listed British shares. At the time of their study, the London market was
a pure dealer market, whereas today it is based on a onsolidated limit order book that
is easily aessible through eletroni hannels. This makes order-splitting easier and the
bid-ask spread proxy for liquidity more reliable, as spreads are rm rather than indiative
as in a dealer market. Nevertheless, the trading patterns we nd are largely onsistent with
the ones reported in Werner and Kleidon (1996).
The empirial results support the model preditions for the stoks that generate
most volume at the NYSE. We do not see the predited pattern aross all ross-listed stoks,
whih is not surprising, beause the benet of order-splitting is redued for stoks with low
(idiosynrati) volume in New York. The empirial pattern for the high NYSE-volume stoks
is inreased volume, volatility, and unhanged or slightly lower depth in the overlap vis-a-vis
the non-overlap. The magnitude of volume inreases is suh that we rejet all models, exept
3
Hasbrouk (1995, p.1188) reports for the thirty Dow stoks that the regional exhanges trade an average
2,080 shares eah ve minutes up to 9,299 shares for Merk. For the ross-listed stoks, we nd that the
NYSE trades an average 19,586 shares eah ve minutes up to 132,679 shares for Vodafone.
4
See the on-line NYSE fatbook. Inidentally, two of the Duth stoks, Royal Duth and Unilever, were
members of the S&P500 at the time of our experiment. They are the only European stoks to ever have
reahed that status (see press release Standard & Poor's, \Standard & Poor's Announes Changes to the
S&P Indies", 7/9/02, www.spglobal.om).
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the full-edged model. This implies that the inreases are primarily due to large liquidity
traders, who onentrate their trading in the overlap and split their orders aross markets.
This demonstrates the importane of the model extension, as the standard Chowdhry and
Nanda (1991) model is rejeted by the data. For these stoks, we zoom in on the overlap
and nd that the diretion of trades is positively orrelated aross markets, onsistent with
order-splitting. We ontrol for positive orrelation due to new information by exploiting the
British tax regime. In the test, we also nd evidene of arbitrage ativity, although at a
small sale. This is onsistent with earlier studies on ross-listed stoks (see, e.g., Jorion
and Shwartz (1986), Kato, Linn, and Shallheim (1991), Ben-Zion, Hauser, and Lieberman
(1996), and Gagnon and Karolyi (2004)).
5
Our ndings add to the regulatory debate on fragmented markets. The hairman
of the Seurities and Exhange Commission (SEC) has spoken of the harmful eets of
fragmentation.
6
The heads of Goldman Sahs, Merrill Lynh, and Morgan Stanley testied
on the need for a entralized limit order book to onsolidate order ow and assure prie-
time priority.
7
The early aademi literature agrees as entralized markets are onsidered
to be ost-eetive due to eonomies-of-sale and beneial for prie disovery as a result
of maximum interation of order ow (see, e.g., Hamilton (1979)). And, it is fair to all
investors. Our evidene supports the notion that order-splitting investors benet at the ost
of loal investors in a fragmented market setting. Reent literature, however, mentions two
main drawbaks. First, entralization ignores the heterogeneity of investors, whose trading
needs might require dierent market strutures (see, e.g., Harris (1993), Blume (2000), Harris
(2003)). U.S. investors, in our setting, might prefer to trade foreign stoks at the NYSE for
a number of reasons, e.g., trades are dollar-denominated, U.S. learing and settlement, same
broker as for U.S. seurities. Seond, multiple trading venues reate ompetition, whih
fosters innovation and redues trading osts (see, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1995), Stoll
(2001)). This argument features partiularly strong in Steil (2002), who alls on U.S. and
5
Inidentally, order-splitting ould explain why Ellul (2002) nds that home market pries for ontinental
European stoks ross-listed in London adjust to large London trades ahead of their exeution.
6
Speeh Levitt at Columbia Law Shool, 9/23/99, and Northwestern Law Shool, 4/16/00.
7
See Wall Street Journal artile, \Sweeping Changes in Market Struture Sought," 2/29/00.
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European regulators to agree on transatlanti exhange aess.
Furthermore, our evidene suggests that theory should onsider order-splitting as
a real possibility. It is, therefore, at odds with models that urrently do not, e.g., Pagano
(1989), Biais (1993), de Frutos and Manzano (2002), and Yin (2004).
Our paper relates to a ontemporaneous paper on the subjet|Baruh, Karolyi,
and Lemmon (2004). The objetives are dierent, as Baruh et al. fous on explaining the
U.S. share of total trading volume. In our model, this share is determined by the (exogenous)
trading ativity of loal liquidity traders. They nd that volume migrates to the exhange
where the stok returns have highest orrelation with other assets traded at the exhange.
Finally, order-splitting by informed traders ould explain why some information
annot be uniquely assigned to markets in the widely used \information share" method-
ology developed in Hasbrouk (1995).
8
The information share of a market measures the
ontribution of prie innovations in that market to the innovation in the (ommon) eÆient
prie. As Hasbrouk (2002, p.333) notes, if \innovations in the markets are orrelated,"
some information annot be assigned uniquely to any of the markets and he, therefore, sug-
gests to alulate lower- and upperbounds. These orrelated innovations are onsistent with
order-splitting by informed traders.
Setion 1 develops the model and ompares volume, volatility, and market depth
for the overlap with the non-overlap for dierent senarios. Setion 2 uses these results to
generate testable hypotheses and introdues the natural experiment of NYSE-listed British
and Duth stoks. Setion 3 presents the empirial results. First, it estimates the patterns
in volume, volatility, and market depth. Seond, it designs and implements a high-frequeny
analysis of order imbalane to trae down order-splitting during the overlap. Setion 4
summarizes the main onlusions.
8
For appliations, see e.g. Huang (2002), Hasbrouk (2003), Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004).
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1 The Model: One Seurity, Overlapping Markets
In this setion, we study what intraday trading patterns|trading during the overlap as
ompared to the non-overlap|arise endogenously when a seurity trades in (partially) over-
lapping markets. We rst tailor the one-period model of Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) to
our setting. We derive an analytial result for trading volume. To make the model more
realisti, we add an additional round to the game, so that liquidity suppliers an ondition
on the foreign transation prie when issuing their new quote. We then derive an analyt-
ial expression for volatility. We expand the model to a multi-period-overlapping-markets
setting to generate model-implied trading patterns. We analyze a number of senarios from
a benhmark senario of fully segmented markets to a full-edged senario with maximum
hoie for sophistiated traders. The step-by-step build-up in senarios allows us to identify
patterns that an arise endogenously, and, more importantly, it illuminates the mehanisms
that generate these patterns.
1.1 The Basi One-Period Model
We start with a brief review of the one-period-two-markets model developed in Chowdhry
and Nanda (1991). Eah market onsists of a liquidity supplier, an informed trader, a small,
and a large liquidity trader. All agents are assumed to be risk-neutral. The informed trader
trades on a private signal on the true value of the seurity, whereas the liquidity traders trade
for exogenous reasons, e.g. hedging or shoks to their wealth. The large liquidity trader has
aess to both markets, whereas the small liquidity trader only trades in her \home market."
These traders ould, for example, represent institutional and retail investors, respetively.
9
The informed trader only trades in her home market, an assumption that will be relaxed at
a later stage. We further assume that liquidity suppliers trade on their own aount and
absorb potential order imbalanes. The one-period game onsists of three rounds:
9
The small liquidity trader represents investors whose trading demand is too small to make the benet
of aess to a seond market weigh up against the (xed) ost of suh aess.
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1. Liquidity suppliers announe prie shedules;
2. Traders observe these shedules and submit their orders|informed traders maximizing
expeted prot, liquidity traders minimizing expeted ost; and
3. Liquidity suppliers observe and absorb the aggregate order imbalane aording to
their announed prie shedules.
At the start of eah period, let
v  the innovation in the value of the seurity at the end of the period;
u
i
 liquidity demand (signed volume) of the small liquidity trader in market i;
d
k
 liquidity demand (signed volume) of the large liquidity trader in market k.
For the remainder of the paper we use supersripts k to indiate the market in whih the
agent originates and subsripts i to indiate her ativity in market i. We drop the supersript
for order imbalane of the small liquidity trader, sine, by assumption, she only trades in her
home market. The two markets are labeled A and B. We assume that v; u
A
; u
B
; d
A
; and d
B
are identially, independently, and normally distributed:
(v; u
i
; d
A
; d
B
)
0
 N(0; diag(
2
v
; 
2
u;i
; 
2
d;A
; 
2
d;A
));
where \diag" transforms a vetor into a diagonal matrix with the vetor as its diagonal. The
endogenous variables are:
x
i
 signed volume in market i by the informed trader of market i;
d
k
i
 signed volume in market i by the large liquidity trader of market k.
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Let
P  unonditional value of the seurity before trading begins;
P
i
 prie harged by the liquidity supplier in market i.
The liquidity supplier in market i only observes the aggregate signed volume in her market.
That is, she does not see the individual ontribution of eah trader group. Her priing
funtion, therefore, an only depend on the aggregate signed volume, whih we dene as the
order imbalane:
!
i
 x
i
+ u
i
+ d
A
i
+ d
B
i
:
The strategy for nding market equilibrium involves three basi steps. First, we hypothesize
linear priing rules for liquidity suppliers:
P
i
  P = 
i
!
i
; (1)
where 
 1
i
is a measure of depth in market i. Seond, we solve the optimization problems for
the informed and liquidity traders. Third, we use the optimized signed volume of all traders
to nd the order imbalane and alulate the liquidity suppliers' prot. Fourth, we set her
prot to zero, as we assume liquidity supply to be perfetly ompetitive or regulated.
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We
nd:

i
=
1
2
1

u;i
p
1 + 

v
; d
k
i
=

j 6=i

i
+ 
j 6=i
d
k
; x
i
=
1
2
i
v; with  

2
d;A
+ 
2
d;B
(
u;A
+ 
u;B
)
2
; (2)
where the indies i,j, and k are either A or B. With a few small adjustments that are
disussed in appendix A, the proof of this result is in Chowdhry and Nanda (1991). In
equilibrium, the large liquidity traders split their orders aross markets, sine 
B
(
A
+
B
)
 1
and 
B
(
A
+ 
B
)
 1
are stritly positive numbers, as both markets have a small liquidity
10
In a eletroni limit order book market we assume liquidity supply through limit orders to be ompetitive;
in a speialist market we assume monitoring by the exhange in order to ensure speialists do not earn
monopolist rents.
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trader. They appear to send more to the market with most small liquidity trading, sine the
share of the order sent to market i inreases in the level of small liquidity trading in that
market (
u;i
). The signed volume of informed traders in both markets is proportional to the
innovation in the value of the seurity. These proportions are inreasing in market depth
(
 1
i
), whih onrms the intuition that informed traders trade more in deeper markets as
it easier to hide information.
In the remainder of this setion, we use the equilibrium results to determine three
more variables of interest: trading volume, volatility, and orrelation in order imbalane
aross markets.
The expeted trading volume in market i is derived in appendix A as:
V olume
i
=

u;i
p
2
n
1 +  + (3 +
p
2)
p
1 + 
o
; with  

d;A
+ 
d;B

u;A
+ 
u;B
: (3)
Note that this is a non-trivial result, as it is not simply the expeted value of the order
imbalane size. The reason is that the latter only measures the size of the transation between
\the market" and the liquidity supplier and it, therefore, does not inlude transations among
the traders.
Contrary to Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), volatility is alulated after we allow
the liquidity suppliers to update their quotes based on the transation prie in the foreign
market. The original model impliitly assumes that liquidity suppliers do not observe the
foreign prie after trading. In modern markets, transation pries are ommuniated in real
time and we, therefore, add a fourth round to the game, to allow liquidity suppliers to update
their estimate of the true value onditional on the transation pries in both markets. Sine
their information sets are equal, both liquidity suppliers quote the same new prie, say P

.
In appendix A, we nd that volatility based on this new prie equals:
V olatility = var(P

  P ) = var(E[vjP
A
;P
B
℄) =
2 + 2
4 + 3

2
v
: (4)
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Interestingly, volatility is dereasing in the \ratio" of large liquidity trading to total liquidity
trading. Intuitively, order-splitting by large liquidity traders makes pries move in lokstep.
Hene, to a lesser extent an liquidity suppliers benet from two \independent" signals on
the true value of the seurity.
The orrelation in order imbalane is alulated in appendix A to be:
(!
A
; !
B
) =
2 + 1
2 + 2
: (5)
The orrelation inreases in large liquidity demand due to inreased order-splitting.
1.2 The Multi-Period Model
For two overlapping markets, the trading day an be split in three periods. In the rst
period, market A is the only market open; in the seond period both markets are open; and
in the third period market B is the only market open. The assoiated time line is:
Market A:
Market B:
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Both markets onsist of a liquidity supplier, an informed trader, a small, and a large liquidity
trader. In period 2 the results of equation (2) hold, whereas in periods 1 and 3, the basi
one-period model simplies to a one-market model for whih the results are summarized in
appendix A.
The results we developed thus far enable us to study how the availability of a
seond market aets trading in the home market. To this end, we set parameters to be
equal aross periods and study how a seond market aets trading in the home market in
terms of volume, volatility, and market depth. We start with the analysis of a benhmark
senario (0), in whih both markets are fully segmented. We then depart in two diretions by
either allowing large liquidity traders aess to the other market or by allowing the informed
10
traders aess to the other market (1a and 1b). The next senario (2) allows both types of
traders to aess the other market. Finally, in a full-edged senario (3), we also allow large
liquidity traders to time their trade in the spirit of Admati and Peiderer (1988). In other
words, they an hoose whether to trade in the rst, seond, or third period. The model
extensions needed for senarios 1b through 3 are developed in appendix A, as well as the
proofs of the propositions. The trading pattern impliations of all senarios are summarized
in Panel A of table 1; the orresponding formulas are inluded in appendix A. Panel B
presents a numerial example.
Senario 0: Fully Segmented Markets
In the benhmark senario, no agent has aess to the foreign market. The implied trading
pattern, however, is non-trivial, as volatility during the overlap is higher than outside the
overlap. The reason is that liquidity suppliers, in the fourth round of the game, observe the
transation prie in the foreign market and use this to update their quote.
Proposition 0. If markets are fully segmented in that no trader has aess to the other
market, we nd that for the overlap as ompared to the non-overlap: (i) volume is equal,
(ii) volatility is higher and, (iii) market depth is equal. Finally, order imbalane is positively
orrelated during the overlap.
The positive orrelation in order imbalane is due to the informed traders in both markets,
who trade on the same signal.
Senario 1a: Allow Large Liquidity Traders to Aess Other Market
In senario 1a, we allow large liquidity traders to aess the foreign market. The implied
patterns hange and are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1a. If large liquidity traders are the only ones with aess to the other market,
we nd that for the overlap as ompared to the non-overlap: (i) for at least one of the two
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markets, volume is lower, (ii) volatility is higher in both markets, and, (iii) for at least one
of the two markets, market depth is lower. Finally, order imbalane is positively orrelated
during the overlap.
The result of lower depth and less volume during the overlap seems ounterintuitive, but
is essentially due to less (signed) volume by large liquidity traders. They, eetively, trade
among themselves when trading in both markets. These ross-trades redue the aggregate
signed volume from large liquidity traders in at least one market omparing the overlap with
the non-overlap. As a result, the liquidity supplier in this market redues depth|inreases

i
|to protet herself against this redution in liquidity trading.
Compared to the benhmark senario, the volatility inrease is lower and the or-
der imbalane orrelation is higher. As disussed, order-splitting by large liquidity traders
redues the information liquidity suppliers an retrieve from prie hanges in both mar-
kets, whih results in a lower volatility inrease. And, order-splitting auses higher order
imbalane orrelation aross markets.
Senario 1b: Allow Informed Traders to Aess Other Market
The results hange if we, instead of large liquidity traders, allow informed traders to aess
the other market.
Proposition 1b. If informed traders are the only ones with aess to the other market, we
nd that for the overlap as ompared to the non-overlap: (i) volume is higher, (ii) volatility
is higher, and, (iii) market depth is higher in both markets. Finally, order imbalane is
positively orrelated during the overlap.
In equilibrium, informed traders trade more aggressively during the overlap as ompared
to the non-overlap. In their optimization, informed traders deide for every marginal order
whether or not the additional expeted prot on this order is higher than the expeted loss
on their \outstanding" orders due to prie onession. During the overlap they ompete,
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whih means that, eetively, they share the losses on the \outstanding" informed orders
when submitting an additional order, whereas they privately enjoy the expeted prot of
the additional order. This makes them trade more aggressively during the overlap. This is
why volume and volatility are higher during the overlap as ompared to the non-overlap.
In fat, the volatility inrease is higher than in the senarios 0 and 1a. This squares well
with intuition, sine liquidity suppliers in the urrent senario get a better signal on the true
seurity value due to more aggressive informed trading. To study the eet on market depth,
we note that liquidity suppliers set the prie hange suh that, in expetation, it is equal to
the true value of the seurity. This goes for the overlap as well as for the non-overlap and
it is for this reason that they use a lower fator 
i
for order imbalane during the overlap,
sine the informed traders' order is larger and total liquidity demand does not hange. In
other words, market depth (
 1
i
) is higher during the overlap.
The orrelation in order imbalane is higher than in the benhmark senario 0, due
to more aggressive informed trading.
Senario 2: Allow Informed and Large Liquidity Traders to Aess Other Market
(1a+1b)
In senario 2, we ombine senarios 1a and 1b and thus allow both the informed and the
large liquidity traders to aess the foreign market.
Proposition 2. If both large liquidity traders and informed traders have aess to the other
market, we nd that volatility is higher for the overlap as ompared to the non-overlap.
Volume and market depth an be higher, unhanged, or lower during the overlap depending
on parameter values. Finally, order imbalane is positively orrelated during the overlap.
The results for volume and depth are ambiguous, sine opening up the foreign market
for large liquidity traders or for informed traders has opposite eets. The relative strength
of eah eet depends on how important large liquidity trading is ompared to small liquidity
trading and on the volatility of the true value, respetively. The volatility inrease is higher
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than in senarios 0 and 1a, due to more aggressive informed trading, but smaller than in
senario 1b, sine order-splitting by large liquidity traders hampers liquidity suppliers in
retrieving the true value of the seurity.
Correlation in order imbalane aross markets is higher than in any previous senario
due to the ontribution of both order-splitting by large liquidity traders and aggressive
trading by informed traders.
Senario 3: Allow Informed and Large Liquidity Traders to Aess Other Market
and Allow Large Liquidity Traders to Time their Trade (2+)
In senario 3, we extend the previous senario by allowing large liquidity traders to time
their trade in the spirit of Admati and Peiderer (1988). Both an deide to trade in period
1, 2, or 3.
Proposition 3. If both large liquidity traders and informed traders have aess to the other
market and large liquidity traders are allowed to time their trades, we nd that large liquidity
trading in the overlap is always a Nash equilibrium and, under ertain onditions, it is the
only Nash equilibrium. Compared to other potential Nash equilibria|onentrated trading
in period 1 or 3|this equilibrium is shown to result in lowest trading osts for both large
liquidity traders. For this equilibrium, we nd that for the overlap as ompared to the non-
overlap: (i) volume is higher, (ii) volatility is higher, and, (iii) market depth is higher in
both markets. Finally, order imbalane is positively orrelated during the overlap.
The Nash equilibrium of onentrated large liquidity trading in the overlap appears
to be the dominant equilibrium. The intuition is that this is the only period in whih
large liquidity traders an benet from eah other and from small liquidity traders in both
markets. In the two other andidate Nash equilbria|onentrated trading in period 1 or
3|the large liquidity traders benet only from one small liquidity trader. Under parameter
onditions that are speied in appendix A, whih an be read as small liquidity trading being
large enough, large liquidity traders have an inentive to deviate from these alternative Nash
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equilibria, sine the benet of additional small liquidity trading during the overlap dominates
the benet of trading with the other large liquidity trader outside the overlap. Even if these
alternative Nash equilibria are viable, the Nash equilibrium of onentrated large liquidity
trading during the overlap is dominant, beause it leads to lowest expeted trading osts for
both large liquidity traders.
In the most likely Nash equilibrium of onentrated trading in the overlap, we nd
higher volume, volatility, and market depth during the overlap. Comparing these results
with those of senario 2, we nd that the volatility inrease is lower, whih, again, an be
traed bak to the intuition that order-splitting hampers liquidity suppliers in inferring the
\true" value of the seurity.
2 Hypotheses and Natural Experiment
We test the predited multi-market trading by either the informed or the large liquidity
traders in a natural experiment of NYSE-listed British and Duth seurities. Heneforth, for
ease of exposition, we refer to both types of trading as order-splitting. The test involves two
stages. First, we use the non-overlap as a benhmark period and test whether the model-
implied trading patterns are onsistent with the empirial patterns. Seond, we test diretly
for order-splitting through a high-frequeny analysis of order imbalane during the overlap.
2.1 Hypotheses
The model's predition for volatility is onsistent aross all senarios.
H1. Volatility is higher during the overlap as ompared to the non-overlap.
But, volume and market depth patterns allow us to disriminate senarios.
H2(0). If markets are fully segmented|no trader has aess to the other market|volume
and market depth remain unhanged during the overlap as ompared to the non-overlap;
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H2(alt). Volume and depth are lower in at least one of the markets (senario 1a) or vol-
ume and depth are higher in both markets (senarios 1b and 3) or a ombination of both
(senario 2).
11
And, zooming in on the overlap, the model's predition for order imbalane is onsistent
aross all senarios.
H3. Order imbalane is positively orrelated aross markets.
But, in order to test whether this is due to order-splitting or just a result of the same
(private) information arriving at both markets, we use the following result.
H4. Order imbalane orrelation aross markets is higher at times of order-splitting (se-
narios 1-3) as ompared to the benhmark senario of segmented markets (senario 0).
It turns out that the British tax regime allows us to identify onditions under whih order-
splitting is not optimal. We will ome bak to this issue, when we design the test.
2.2 Natural Experiment: NYSE-Listed British and Duth Stoks
For order-splitting to our in real-world markets, an ideal experiment should onsist of
markets that satisfy (i) synhroniity, (ii) liquid trading in the same seurity, (iii) simul-
taneous aessibility by at least one trader, (iv) seurity fungibility, and (v) an equal level
of transpareny. The last ondition is imposed to prevent traders from routing orders to
the least transparent market (see, e.g., Gemmill (1996) and Bloomeld and O'Hara (2000)).
In addition, to detet the eets of order-splitting, we need a signiant non-overlap as a
benhmark period.
The natural experiment we propose is U.S. and European trading in NYSE-listed
European stoks. We analyze 1997-1998 trading in Duth stoks and 2002-2003 trading in
11
Volume and market depth remaining unhanged in senario 2 is a highly unlikely outome. If parameters
are sampled from a ontinuous distribution, this would be a zero probability event.
16
British stoks. These stoks both represent roughly a quarter of \European" volume at the
NYSE in reent years. We selet 25 British stoks and ontrols that math these stoks in
terms of volume.
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For the Duth market, we selet four stoks, as, stronger than the British
market, U.S. volume is skewed towards a very limited number of shares. A omplete list of
all stoks and their volume in both markets has been added as Appendix C.
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London
Amsterdam
New York
" " " " " "
EST 3:00 3:30 9:30 10:30 11:30 16:00
London Amsterdam New York Amsterdam London New York
Open Open Open Close Close Close
The experiment meets the ve onditions. (i) Synhroniity: the above time table
for London, Amsterdam, and New York trading shows that there is a one- or two-hour
trading overlap.
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(ii) Liquidity: on both sides of the Atlanti trading is highly liquid, in
partiular during the overlap. Volume in New York is at least US$ 10 million a month
for all stoks and, relative to the home market, the U.S. market share ranges from 1% to
30%. (iii) Aessibility: investors an trade in all markets simultaneously, as all markets
are equipped with eletroni order routing systems open to foreign investors. As a matter
of fat, the author has seen traders aess both markets from a split sreen on the trading
oor of a major bank on Wall Street. (iv) Fungibility: the Depositary Reeipt (e.g. ADR)
that is traded on the NYSE an be onverted to the ordinary share (or vie versa) at a
12
The volume mathing is not straightforward for the British market, as the stoks that generate most
volume are almost all ross-listed. For these, it is, therefore, hard to nd ontrol stoks with the same
volume. We follow Werner and Kleidon (1996) and hoose to assign ontrol stoks top-down, starting with
the highest volume stok available and not using the same stok more than one.
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Some of the shares also trade on other (European) exhanges, but volume in these venues is typially
negligible vis-a-vis NYSE and home market volume. We note that the rms Unilever and Royal Duth/
Shell have seurities trading in Amsterdam and London, but, altough entitled to the same dividend, these
are not the same seurities and are, therefore, not fungible. For a thorough disussion of these so-alled
\twin shares," we refer to Froot and Dabora (1999).
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In the spring, Europe hanges to daylight-savings time one week ahead of the U.S. This week has been
removed from the sample.
17
ost of approximately 15 basis points at a depositary bank.
15
For the British market, a
onversion tax of 150 basis points applies, whih makes order-splitting optimal only when
prie dierenes are \large enough." We will make this preise when designing our test
on order-splitting. (v) Transpareny: the level of transpareny in all markets is high sine
trades and best quotes are disseminated in real time.
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The time table also shows that there
is a signiant non-overlap to serve as a benhmark period.
All three markets, essentially, feature an eletroni limit order book. Amsterdam
an be onsidered a pure limit order book market, as speialist intervention is negligible.
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London runs a similar system, but allows for o-market trading among dealers. New York
allows for the speialist or oor brokers to improve on the liquidity in the order book.
For both samples, we exploit one year of tik data. The British sample runs from
November 1, 2002, through Otober 31, 2003; the Duth sample from July 1, 1997, through
June 30, 1998. The dataset ontains all trades and quotes in the ross-listed shares on both
sides of the Atlanti and it ontains all quotes in the exhange rate.
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Table 2 provides summary statistis for both samples. We aggregate the British
stoks in quintiles based on U.S. trading volume to onserve spae. We retain, however,
individual results for stoks in the rst quintile, as we expet strongest results for these
stoks. Panel A presents average volume, volatility, quoted and eetive spread for the
overlapping period; Panel B presents these statistis for the full trading day. The results
lead to some interesting observations. First, U.S. volume is non-trivial as the NYSE trades,
on average, more than 1,000 shares every ve minutes. Relative to the home market, the
U.S. market share ranges from 1% to 10% for British stoks and from 30% to 50% for Duth
stoks. Seond, volatility dierenes aross markets are small. This is not surprising for the
15
This servie is provided by, e.g. the Bank of New York, Citibank, and JPMorgan. Although the
transation is not done in real-time, the arbitrageur does not run a risk on an \open position," as he does
not have to settle the trades in both markets immediately, but in a matter of days.
16
The LSE allows for o-market trades that need not be reported instantaneously. Most volume, however,
omes through the eletroni order book SETS and is reported in real-time.
17
At the time of the experiment, a speialist (\hoekman") was assigned to eah stok, but for the most
liquid stoks, he partiipated in very few trades, as was onrmed by a Euronext oÆial.
18
The data soures are: NYSE, Euronext-Amsterdam, the London Stok Exhange, and Olsen&Assoiates.
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overlapping period, as arbitrage ensures that pries move in lokstep. For the non-overlap,
it shows that ontinued NYSE trading, after the European markets lose, appears to move
pries signiantly.
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Third, quoted spreads at the NYSE are lower than the London spreads
for the top quintile of British stoks, but higher for the other stoks. This omparison,
however, is unfair to the NYSE, as the speialist often provides prie improvement over the
quoted spread. If we ompare both markets in terms of eetive spread, we nd that the
NYSE is ompetitive, whih is promising in view of the order-splitting hypotheses onsidered
in this paper.
3 Results
The results are presented in two subsetions. First, we study intraday patterns to test
hypotheses 1 and 2. Seond, we test for order-splitting by zooming in on the overlap and
studying ve-minute order imbalane orrelations.
3.1 Intraday Trading Patterns
We study intraday patterns in volatility, volume, and liquidity by doumenting the hange
in the home market when the NYSE opens and the hange at the NYSE when the home
market loses. We use half-hour intervals before and after the event. For the British sample,
we do the same for the volume-mathed single-listed stoks in order isolate the eet of the
ross-listing. We alulate standard errors after orreting for dierenes in daily values.
20
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In a ontemporary paper, Menkveld, Koopman, and Luas (2003), we study to what extent this volatility
is noise or information.
20
We sale all values by daily averages, as we are interested in intraday eets and, therefore, want to
dispose of interday variation.
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H1: Higher Volatility during the Overlap?
For the stoks that generate most volume in New York, we nd evidene onsistent with
the model's predition of inreased volatility during the overlap. Table 3 presents volatility
hanges in the home market (left-hand side) and volatility hanges on the NYSE (right-hand
side). For the top quintile of British stoks, volatility in London inreases by 93.4% when
the NYSE opens. The hanges for the lower quintiles are smaller and range from 49.1% to
58.7%. Part of the inrease is arguably due to the fat that the NYSE open is a (ommon)
information event. This is reeted in the signiant volatility inreases for the ontrol
stoks. We nd that only for the top quintile British stoks, volatility is signiantly higher
than its ontrol group, 43.9% higher on average.
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In New York, we nd that volatility for
this quintile dereases a signiant 23.9% more than it does for the ontrol stoks when
the London market loses. The top graphs in gure 1 illustrate the inreased volatility
during the overlap for this top quintile. For the U.S. market, the ontrol stoks are not
appropriate benhmarks for the start of the interval, as they annot lean on a European
market for referene pries. We do see a drop in volatility when London loses for the ross-
listed shares, whih we do not see for the ontrol stoks. For the Duth stoks, we also nd
volatility inreases on the NYSE open, 70.7% on average, and volatility dereases on the
Amsterdam lose, 30.2% on average.
H2: No Change in Volume and Depth?
Consistent with the volatility results, we nd that volume during the overlap is signantly
higher for the stoks that generate most U.S. volume. Table 4 shows that, for the top
quintile British stoks, volume inreases by 81.9% on the NYSE open, whih is a signiant
42.7% higher than the inrease for the ontrol stoks. And, NYSE volume dereases for
these stoks by an average 105.9% on the London lose, a signiant 87.7% more than the
21
The other British quintiles do not show disproportionate volatility inreases in London on the NYSE
open. This seems to be at odds with the model as it predits inreased volatility even in a segmented market
setting. The model, however, assumes the existene of an informed trader in the NYSE market, whih might
be too strong an assumption for these thinly traded stoks.
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derease for ontrol stoks. The bottom graphs in gure 1 illustrate these ndings. For the
other quintiles, the volume inreases are not signiantly dierent from the ontrol stoks.
For the Duth stoks, we nd an average volume inrease in Amsterdam of 67.9% on the
NYSE open and an average volume derease in New York of 29.0% on the Amsterdam lose.
Market depth as measured by eetive spread remains largely unhanged in the
home market on the NYSE open, but inreases in New York on the home market lose.
Table 5 shows that for the top quintile British stoks, we nd that spreads are 0.4% higher
on the NYSE open, a signiant 4.6% less than the inrease for ontrol stoks. The eet
is small eonomially and not uniform aross all stoks in this quintile. The inrease in
New York on the London lose is 7.2%, whih is a signiant 14.4% higher than the 7.2%
derease for the ontrol stoks. We nd similar results for the other quintiles and for the
Duth stoks.
The pattern of largely unhanged depth in London for the overlap and slightly higher
depth in New York appears to be onsistent aross three measures of liquidity. Figure 2 plots
the top quintile intraday pattern for quoted spread, eetive spread, and an \empirial" Kyle-
. The last measure is based on OLS regressions of ve-minute midquote returns on order
imbalane and proxies market impat. The patterns for quoted and eetive spread are very
similar, whih shows that the \displayed" liquidity orrelates high with the \onsumed"
liquidity. The seond measure of \onsumed" liquidity, the Kyle-, seems to inrease in
London on the New York open and the inrease is signiantly higher vis-a-vis the ontrol
stoks. This seems to be a temporary inrease as it drops bak to ontrol stok levels further
into the overlap.
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The results of an inrease in Kyle- and unhanged eetive spreads an be reoniled when the diretion
of market orders in the rst half-hour of NYSE trading is positively orrelated with the hange in quotes due
to publi information (i.e. not triggered by an inoming market order). That is, eetive spreads measure
the impat from trade to trade, whereas the \empirial" Kyle- is an aggregate measure, whih relates order
imbalane to the sum of all quote hanges, thus inluding quote hanges that are not triggered by order ow.
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Disussion of the Results
In summary, we nd inreased volatility, volume, and largely unhanged or (slightly) higher
depth in the overlapping period for the top quintile of British stoks and the Duth experi-
ment seems to reonrm this result. For the other British quintiles we do not nd signiant
dierenes omparing the results for ross-listed stoks to their ontrols.
For the top quintile British stoks and the Duth stoks, qualitatively, senarios
1b, 2, and 3 are onsistent with the observed patterns, but senario 3 is the most likely
andidate. In appendix A we show that volume inreases in senarios 1a and 2 are bounded
to a maximum of 21.82%, whereas they are unbounded in the third senario. We doument
a 42.7% higher volume in London and a 87.7% higher volume in New York. Suh levels are,
therefore, only onsistent with senario 3. This implies that the result is partially due to large
liquidity traders who onentrate their orders in the overlap and split them aross markets
at the ost of small liquidity traders. Interestingly, the absene of signiant inreases for
the other British quintiles is onsistent with one of the onditions of senario 3, i.e. \small
liquidity trading" should be large enough to reate the inentive for large liquidity traders
to alloate their orders to the overlap. As liquidity in the U.S. market is relatively low
for these quintiles, suh inentive might be absent for these stoks. The unhanged market
depth, however, seems to be at odds with the model's predited higher depth. The model
an be alibrated to yield unhanged market depth by inreasing the (exogenous) arrival
rate of information (
v
) for the overlapping hour. This hange does not aet the volume
pattern, but leads to stronger inreases in volatility for the overlap. The observed patterns
are, therefore, onsistent with the third senario.
In the next setion, we zoom in on the overlap to ondut a diret test on the
order-splitting that is predited by the third senario.
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3.2 High Frequeny Analysis of Order Imbalane
To detet order-splitting (for hypotheses 3 and 4), we study orrelation in order imbalane
aross markets for ve minute intervals. A lean test aounts for potential arbitrage trades,
British transation tax, and potential \mirostruture" dynamis in order ow.
We ontrol for negative orrelation in order imbalane due to arbitrage by ondition-
ing on the availability of arbitrage opportunities. An arbitrage trade in both experiments is
not free of ost, as the NYSE Depositary Reeipt (DR) is exhanged for the ordinary share
(or vie versa) at a ost of approximately 15 basis points. As arbitrage trades ause negative
orrelation in order imbalane|a buy in one market oinides with a sell in the other|this
ould dampen or even annihilate the positive orrelation due to order-splitting. We ondi-
tion on the availability of arbitrage opportunities at the start of an interval to ontrol for
potential arbitrage trades. That is, if the ask in one market is 15 basis points higher than
the bid in the other market, we onsider the interval a potentially arbitrage \ontaminated"
interval. In evaluating arbitrage opportunities, we also onsider the exhange rate trans-
ation, that is, we take the bid or ask side in the the FX market, as appropriate. Finally,
we have to onsider the British transation tax, and the preise denition of an arbitrage
opportunity is, therefore, postponed to the next paragraphs.
The tax imposed on transations in London, Stamp Duty Reserve Tax (SDRT),
allows us to disriminate order-splitting from same diretion trades due to new information
arriving at both markets. Contrary to Amsterdam and New York, buyers in London are
taxed 50 basis points. And, to prevent order ow from migrating to the U.S., onversions
to U.S. Depositary Reeipts are taxed 150 basis points. For reverse transations, a tax
of 50 pene applies. We use the SDRT to sort intervals into three ategories: arbitrage,
order-splitting, and ontrol intervals. Arbitrage in the British tax regime, essentially, sets
the lower bound prie of Depositary Reeipts equal to the London prie and the upper
bound prie equal to 150 basis points above the London prie. In the implementation, we
use exat onditions for arbitrage that also aount for the 15 basis points onversion fee
and the exhange rate transation. These onditions are inluded as appendix B. To nd
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the optimal onditions for order-splitting in this regime, we dierentiate between DR buyers
and sellers and ordinary share buyers and sellers. These onditions amount to order-splitting
opportunities when \pries are at or lose to the arbitrage bounds." We label the intervals
where these onditions are met, within a 10 basis point margin, as \order-splitting" intervals.
For the exat onditions we refer to appendix B. We note that these onditions assign some
intervals to the order-splitting ategory as well as the arbitrage ategory and we deide to
label these intervals as arbitrage intervals to preserve lean order-splitting intervals. The
unlabelled intervals serve as ontrols that potentially exhibit positive orrelation in order
imbalane due to new information.
As Amsterdam transations are not taxed, prie dierentials are onsiderably smaller
and the order-splitting onditions are pratially always met. We deide to label all no-
arbitrage intervals as order-splitting intervals for this experiment. Figure 3 illustrates the
impat of the SDRT by plotting midquote dierentials aross markets for both experiments.
The SDRT auses dierentials for British seurities to have a bimodal distribution, whereas
we nd a unimodal distribution for the Duth seurities.
Finally, we ontrol for \mirostruture" dynamis in order ow by studying order
imbalane as well as order imbalane innovations. The latter are dened as the dierene
between the observed order imbalane for time interval t and the predited order imbalane
for the interval based on information available at the start of the interval. Inspired by
Hasbrouk (1991), we estimate a vetor-autoregressive (VAR) model for foreign as well as
domesti order imbalane and inlude lagged returns as explanatory variables. Consistent
with Hasbrouk's results, we nd positive oeÆients for lagged imbalane and negative
oeÆients for lagged returns.
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We then use these results to alulate order imbalane
innovations.
For the test, we onstrut the order imbalanes as the sum of signed trade sizes,
where we use the standard Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to sign eah trade.
23
The results are available from the author upon request.
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H3: Positive Correlation in Order Imbalane?
We nd strong empirial support for positive orrelation in order imbalane, with the exep-
tion of some \arbitrage" intervals that show negative orrelation. Panel A of table 6 reports
ve-minute order imbalane orrelations for the three types of intervals we distinguish; panel
B reports these results for order imbalane innovations. We nd highest orrelations for the
top quintile British stoks and the Duth stoks. For the order-splitting intervals, order
imbalane orrelations range from 0.15 to 0.40. For the intervals that are neither order-
splitting, nor arbitrage, we also nd signiant positive orrelation, onsistent with trading
in both markets that is triggered by the arrival of the same new (private) information. We
nd similar results for the other British quintiles, with the exeption that positive orrelation
is now insigniant for order-splitting intervals. For the arbitrage intervals, we nd positive
and negative orrelations, but none of them is signiant. Panel B shows that these results
are robust, as orrelations appear to be unaeted by ontrolling for mirostruture eets.
Inidentally, arbitrage opportunities are almost non-existent for the top quintile of British
stoks and our with low frequeny (less than than 15%) for the other stoks.
H4: Higher Correlation at times of Order-Splitting?
For the top quintile British stoks and for the Duth stoks, we nd signiantly higher
orrelations for intervals with order-splitting opportunities. We nd that the average orre-
lation for the top quintile British stoks is 0.23, whih is a signiant 0.08 higher than the
0.15 orrelation for ontrol stoks. Furthermore, we nd that this orrelation is higher for
eah of the ve member stoks, whih is a 2
 5
= 0:03 probability event for ve draws from a
standard binomial distribution. If we take the 0.15 as a benhmark for the Duth stoks, we
nd that orrelations are a signiant 0.11 higher, again onsistent aross all stoks.
24
Panel
B reveals that these results are robust to ontrolling for mirostruture eets. Consistent
24
Interestingly, for the Duth stoks we nd a similar level of orrelation for the arbitrage intervals. Further
inspetion shows that these arbitrage opportunities typially our at times of strong buying or selling in
both markets and disappear within the interval. We onsider this a by-produt of multi-market trading
rather than real \arbitrage opportunities."
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with the intraday patterns, we do not nd evidene of inreased orrelation for the other
British quintiles.
4 Conlusion
In this paper, we study order-splitting based on a natural experiment of NYSE-listed British
and Duth stoks. Theoretially, we expet two types of traders|informed traders and large
liquidity traders|to split orders, whih is at the ost of loal traders. We study this behavior
in a two-stage approah.
First, we study trading patterns and use the non-overlap as a benhmark period. We
develop a model for trading in partially overlapping markets, by extending the Chowdhry
and Nanda (1991) model to allow for large liquidity traders to time their trades in the spirit
of Admati and Peiderer (1988). We use the model to understand trading in the overlap and
to predit the trading patterns that might arise endogenously. That is, we predit volume,
volatility, and market depth for the overlap and for the non-overlap. Several senarios are
explored from a benhmark senario of fully segmented markets|no partiipant has aess
to the other market|to a full-edged model|informed traders and large liquidity traders
have aess to the other market and large liquidity traders are allowed to time their trades.
For the British and Duth stoks that generate most U.S. volume, we nd inreased volume,
volatility, and unhanged market depth in the overlap. This pattern is inonsistent with
most of the senarios, inluding the standard Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) model. It is
only onsistent with the full-edged model, if we inrease the (exogenous) arrival rate of
information for the overlap vis-a-vis the non-overlap. In this senario, informed investors
split their orders aross markets as well as large liquidity traders who alloate their orders
to the overlap. For the stoks that generate less U.S. volume, we do not nd signiant
dierenes omparing the overlap to the non-overlap, whih is onsistent with the model's
predition that large liquidity traders only alloate to the overlap if loal trading (by small
liquidity traders) is suÆiently high.
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Seond, we design a diret test on order-splitting through a high-frequeny analysis
of order imbalane during the overlap. We nd that home market and NYSE order imbalane
are signiantly positively orrelated, whih is onsistent with order-splitting. Our main
onern is that this positive orrelation is also onsistent with the benhmark senario of
segmented markets, as this is due to informed traders in both markets, who trade on the
same new (private) information. We benet from British tax law that allows us disriminate
intervals with order-splitting opportunities from intervals without suh opportunities. For
the stoks that we expet to exhibit order-splitting based on the intraday pattern analysis
(i.e. those with most U.S. volume), we nd that orrelation is signiantly higher for the
intervals with order-splitting opportunities. For the remaining stoks, this dierene is not
signiant. In the analysis, we ontrol for arbitrage trading by onditioning on the intervals
without arbitrage opportunities.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions
Summary results: We start with a summary table that ontains equilibrium values for volume, volatility,
market depth, and order imbalane orrelation for all senarios. It presents equilibrium values for the overlap
and the non-overlap. We only report the non-overlap values for market A, beause the model is symmetri
in A and B. The results for senario 3 are based on the most likely Nash equilibrium of onentrated trading
during the overlap.
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Proof of equilibrium results for the basi one-period model: The dierenes between our one-
period model and the standard model in Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) are minor and we therefore rely on
the original proof and only disuss how the dierenes aet the results and the proof. First, ontrary to
one informed trader with aess to both markets in Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), our model features an
informed trader in both markets without aess to the other market. This does not aet the results, sine
the informed trader's maximization problem in market i,
max
x
A
E[x
A
(v   
A
 !
A
)℄; (6)
is the same whether it is our \domesti" informed trader or the \Chowdhry and Nanda (1991)" informed
trader. Seond, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) only have one large liquidity trader with aess to both
markets, whereas we generalize this model to two large liquidity traders, one in eah market. Both these
traders fae the minimization problem:
min
fd
A
A
;d
A
B
g
X
i=A;B
E[d
A
i
 
i
 !
i
℄ suh that d
A
A
+ d
A
B
= d
A
: (7)
Solving rst order onditions for this equation leads to
d
i
j
= k
j
d
i
for i,j 2 fA,Bg with k
j
=

i 6=j

i 6=j
+
j
and thus (d
A
j
+ d
B
j
) = k
j
(d
A
+ d
B
);
(8)
whih, essentially, is one of the intermediary equations in the Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) model, when we
interpret (d
A
+ d
B
) as the signed volume demand by the large liquidity trader in their model. The results
of equation (2), therefore, naturally follow from Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) by replaing the variane of
the large liquidity trader's signed volume in the original model (
2
d
) by the sum of varianes of the large
liquidity traders in our model (
2
d;A
+ 
2
d;B
).
Proof for expeted volume in the basi one-period model: The variane of order imbalane
(!
i
) is not an appropriate measure of trading volume, sine it does not apture trades that are rossed between
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traders. In general, suppose we have n traders with market orders s
1
,s
2
, . . . ,s
k
, whih are independently
and identially distributed with mean 0. Let s
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i
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 
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where 
i
is the standard deviation of s
i
(see Admati and Peiderer (1988)). For our model we, therefore,
nd
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. If we insert all onstants we nd
the result presented in equation (3).
Proof for volatility in the basi one-period model: The tehnial proof is in Chowdhry and
Nanda (1991, p. 504): proof of proposition 2. Whereas the fous of their proof is the informativeness of
pries, it, essentially, is a proof of the variane of the expeted value of the seurity onditional on the prie
hanges witnessed in both markets, whih is our measure of volatility.
Proof for order ow orrelation in the basi one-period model: The proof is in Chowdhry
and Nanda (1991, p. 503): proof of proposition 1.
Equilibrium results for one-market model: The equilibrium results for the one-market setting
are relatively straightforward:
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Proof of Proposition 0: Trading during the overlap equals trading during the non-overlap, as no trader
has aess to the other market. Therefore volume and depth do not hange. The liquidity supplier, however,
in the nal stage of the game observes the transation prie in the foreign market and uses it to update her
estimate of the value of the seurity (v). Sine, in this nal stage, both liquidity suppliers have the same
information set, their onditional estimate of v is the same and they therefore issue the same new quote.
The volatility of this quote is:
V olatility = var(P

  P ) = var(E[vjfP
A
;P
B
g℄) =
2
3

2
v
: (12)
Sine this senario is a speial ase of the basi one-period model, we use the volatility equation for this
model, equation (4), and set the demand of small liquidity traders so that it inludes the demand of the
\domesti" large liquidity trader. Large liquidity traders' demand is then set to zero. The same approah is
used to alulate orrelation in net volume for whih we nd:
(!
A
; !
B
) =
1
2
: (13)
Proof of Proposition 1a: In this senario, only large liquidity traders have aess to the other
market, so we use the results of the multi-period model developed in the main text. For order imbalane
orrelation and volatility, the laims in proposition 1a follow from inspetion of equations (4), (5) and (11).
The laims on market depth and volume require expliit proofs.
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We laim market depth is lower in at least one market. Suppose not, then we know market depth
during the overlap in both markets is at least as good as outside the overlap and for market A we nd:
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We get a similar result for market B. Adding these two inequalities we get
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whih ontradits both markets having a small liquidity trader (
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> 0, 
u;B
> 0). Hene market depth
during the overlap is lower in at least one market.
We laim volume is lower in at least one market. Suppose not. This implies that total volume
during the overlap is not lower than the sum of volumes in both markets outside the overlap and, thus,
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e, market volume is
lower in at least one of the markets.
Proof of Proposition 1b and 2: In propositions 1b and 2, the informed traders in eah market
have aess to the other market. As 1b is a speial ase of 2, we fous on 2. We extend the basi one-
period model by re-evaluating equation (6), i.e. the optimization problem of the informed trader. The new
optimization equation is:
max
x
A
i
E[x
A
i
(v   
i
(x
A
i
+ x
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+ d
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B
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Solving this problem for informed trader A yields:
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As informed trader B faes a similar optimization problem in market i, we an alulate order imbalane in
market i due to informed traders to be:
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We then solve eah large liquidity trader's optimization problem presented in equation (7) and nd
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for the signed volume in market i originating from large liquidity traders:
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We use equations (20) and (22) to nd the order imbalane in eah market and solve the model by setting
the liquidity supplier's prot equal to zero. For liquidity supplier A, we nd:
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we solve it and nd:
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With this result, we alulate volume, volatility, and order imbalane orrelation. For volume we apply
equation (9) and get:
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value of market depth, we get:
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To alulate volatility, we follow the methodology of proposition 2 in Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), with the
following (intermediate) results:
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To alulate order imbalane orrelation, we follow the methodology of proposition 1 in Chowdhry and
Nanda (1991), with the following (intermediate) results:
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With these results we prove proposition 1b, whih states that if informed traders are the only ones with aess
to the other market, volume, volatility, and market depth are higher during the overlap as ompared the
non-overlap and that there is a positive orrelation in order imbalane aross markets. For the non-overlap,
nothing hanges and the results are summarized in equation (11). For the overlap we an use the results
of equations (24), (26), (27), and (28), in whih, for eah market, we add the demand of the large liquidity
traders to that of the small liquidity traders, as large liquidity traders annot aess the foreign market. In
this ase, the parameters  and  are equal to zero, the formulas simplify and the desired results follow by
inspetion.
We then use equations (24), (26), (27), and (28) to prove proposition 2, whih laims that volatil-
ity is higher during the overlap, order imbalane orrelation is positive, and no preditions an be made
for volume and market depth. To prove the last two laims, we argue that senario 2 is a ombination
of senarios 1a and 1b, sine both informed traders and large liquidity traders have aess to the other
market. For volume and market depth, these two senarios lead to opposite preditions and we an get
arbitrarily lose to both preditions in senario 2 by setting the demand of large liquidity traders to a
small or large enough number. For example, the values (
u;A
; 
u;B
; 
d;A
; 
d;B
) = (0:9; 0:9; 0:1; 0:1) and
(
u;A
; 
u;B
; 
d;A
; 
d;B
) = (0:1; 0:1; 0:9; 0:9) yield the desired results. The volatility during the overlap is
higher, sine for the overlap we know
2
3
< var(P ) 
4
5
and volatility is, therefore, higher than the non-
overlap volatility. The orrelation in order imbalane is positive, as it evident from equation (28).
Proof of Proposition 3: In senario 3, large liquidity traders are allowed to time their trade.
To prove the laims of proposition 3 we have to nd all Nash equilibria. Large liquidity traders hoose
31
the period they want to trade based on the ost of trading. Using equations (7) and (21) we nd for large
liquidity trader A:
Cost Overlap = E
"

A;2


B;2

A;2
+ 
B;2
d
A

2
+ 
B;2


A;2

A;2
+ 
B;2
d
A

2
#
=

A;2

B;2

A;2
+ 
B;2
2
2
d;A
;
Cost Non-Overlap = E
h

m
 
d
A

2
i
= 
m
2
2
d;A
, m 2 f
A,1
; 
B,3
g; (29)
where the subsripts indiate the market and the period, respetively. Note that total large liquidity demand
is set to 2
2
d;A
, whih ensures onsisteny aross senarios. We nd similar expressions for trader B. The
options of this game are, therefore:
Trader A n Trader B Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Period 1 I II III
Period 2 IV V
Period 3 VI
We restrit attention to options I through VI, as the problem is symmetri. We start with options II, III,
and V and show that in these ases it is optimal for the trader trading outside the overlap to swith to the
overlap. In option II it is optimal for trader A to swith from period 1 to period 2, sine using equations
(11), (24), and (29), we nd:
Cost = (

A;2

B;2

A;2
+ 
B;2
  
A;1
)
2
d;A
=
1
2
(
r
8
9
1
q
(
u;A
+ 
u;B
)
2
+ 
2
d;A
+ 
2
d;B
 
1
q

2
u;A
+ 
2
d;A
) < 0: (30)
For the same reason, trader B will move from period 3 to the overlap in option V. Options II and V, therefore,
annot be Nash equilibria. In option III, it is optimal for trader A to move to the overlap, sine:
Cost = (

A;2

B;2

+
A;2

B;2
  
A;1
)
2
d;A
=
1
2
(
r
8
9
1
q
(
u;A
+ 
u;B
)
2
+ 
2
d;A
 
1
q

2
u;A
+ 
2
d;A
) < 0: (31)
The same goes for trader B. Options I, IV, and VI remain as potential Nash equilibria. For option I, the
hange in ost for trader A when moving from period 1 to period 2 equals:
Cost = (

A;2

B;2

A;2
+ 
B;2
  
A;1
)
2
d;A
=
1
2
(
r
8
9
1
q
(
u;A
+ 
u;B
)
2
+ 
2
d;A
 
1
q

2
u;A
+ 
2
d;A
+ 
2
d;B
): (32)
This expression is negative, if
either 
2
d;A
> 8
2
d;B
+ 8  9
2
u;B
( ) or, (33)
if not () then 
u;A
>  9
u;B
+
q
8  9
2
u;B
  
2
d;A
+ 8
2
d;B
.
If we hange 
2
d;A
and 
2
d;B
, we get the expression for trader B. If for either trader A or trader B, it is
ost-eÆient to move to the seond period, we know from evaluating options II and V that the other trader
moves as well and we end up with onentrated trading in the overlap. It is evident from options II and V
that no trader will move to the non-overlap and onentrated trading during the overlap is therefore a Nash
equilibrium. If these onditions are not satised for traders A and B, either onentrated trading in period
1 or in period 3 is a Nash equilibrium, as neither trader is willing to move to period 2 from onentrated
trading in either period 1 or period 3|options I and VI. We also onlude that they are not willing to move
to the other non-overlap, sine they would redue ost even more by moving to the overlapping period|see
ost analysis option III. Sine it is sub-optimal for them to move to period 2, we onlude that it is therefore
sub-optimal for them to move to the other non-overlapping period.
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Although onentrated trading by large liquidity traders in periods 1 and 3 are potential Nash
equilibria, the ost of trading for both liquidity traders are higher in these two alternative Nash equilibria,
as, e.g., the ost dierene for trader A between trading in period 1 and 2 is,
Cost
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 Cost
2
= (
A;1
 

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
B;2

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+
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=
1
2
(
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
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+
2
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+
2
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 
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8
9
1
q
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u;A
+
u;B
)
2
+
2
d;A
+
2
d;B
)
2
d;A
> 0
(34)
Similar expressions hold for trader B and omparing period 3 with period 2.
As onentrated trading in period 2 is the Nash equilibrium with lowest trading ost, we further
analyze this equilibrium to show that, as laimed in proposition 3, volume, volatility, and market depth are
higher during the overlap. In this equilibrium, the volume dierene omparing period 1 to period 2 is:
Volume
A,2
 Volume
A,1
=

u;A
p
2
(4 +
p
2)  (1 +
p
2 + (
p
2 + (1 +
p
2)
p
3)
p
1 + 2)) > 0; (35)
sine  and  are greater or equal to zero. The volatility dierene is:
Volatility
A,2
 Volatility
A,1
= (
8 + 4
12 + 5
 
1
2
) > 0; (36)
sine  is greater or equal to zero. The dierene in market depth is:

A,2
  
A,1
=
1
2

v

u;A
(
r
8
9
1
p
1 + 2
  1) < 0; (37)
sine  is greater or equal to zero. This shows that markets are deeper during the overlap.
The orrelation in order imbalane equals:
(!
A
; !
B
) =
9
17
(1 +
2
2 + 1
) > 0: (38)
Comparing period 3 with period 2 yields the same results.
Appendix B: Arbitrage and Order-Splitting Conditions
Arbitrage opportunities exist, when
DR
bid
> (1 + CF + 0:015) ORD
ask
 FX
ask
(Buy London, Sell New York); (39)
ORD
bid
> (1 + CF) ADR
ask
 FX
 1
bid
+ 50p (Buy New York, Sell London); (40)
where DR is depositary reeipt, ORD is ordinary share, CF is the onversion fee for hanging DRs to ORDs
or vie versa, and FX is the exhange rate, expressed as British Pounds to the U.S. Dollar. Opportunities
for order-splitting exist, when
DR
bid
= (1  CF )  ORD
bid
 FX
bid
(DR sellers split); (41)
ORD
bid
= (1  CF ) DR
bid
 FX
 1
ask
  0:015  ORD
bid
(ORD sellers split); (42)
DR
ask
= ORD
ask
 FX
ask
 (1 + CF ) + 0:015  ORD
ask
 FX
ask
(DR buyers split); (43)
1:005 ORD
ask
= DR
ask
 FX
 1
bid
 (1 + CF ) + 50p (ORD buyers split); (44)
where in equations (42) and (43) the one-o tax of 150 basis points applies and in equation (44) the regular
SDRT of 50 basis points applies as the ORD buyer has to pay, and, if buying in the U.S., the onversion fee
of 50 pene applies.
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Appendix C: NYSE-listed British and Duth Stoks and Control Stoks
This table presents (i) NYSE-listed British stoks and their U.S. and U.K. ontrol stoks and (ii) NYSE-listed Duth stoks. Seurity odes are
presented for all stoks as well as average 2003 monthly trading volume for the British stoks and 1997-1998 volume for the Duth stoks. We
follow the methodology proposed by Werner and Kleidon (1996) in assigning ontrol stoks to the ross-listed stoks.
UK(NL)
Symbol
US
Symbol
UK(NL)
Volume
in mln
$(e)
US Vol-
ume in
mln $
UK Control Stok UK
Symbol
UK
Volume
in mln
$
US Control Stok US
Symbol
US Vol-
ume in
mln $
British stoks
BP pl BP BP. 7,433 2,447 Marks & Spener MKS 1,585 Lennar Corp. LEN 1,783
Vodafone VOD VOD 9,105 1,136 Teso TSCO 1,733 Aberrombie & Fith ANF 1,080
HSBC Holdings HBC HSBA 5,553 1,136 BAE Systems BA. 1,071 Caremark Rx CMX 1,060
AstraZenea AZN AZN 3,795 1,059 Standard Chartered STAN 1,052 Cox Comm. In. COX 1,029
GlaxoSmithKline GSK GSK 6,016 731 Centria CNA 1,091 Amdos Ltd. DOX 722
Diageo DEO DGE 1,784 285 Safeway SFW 871 NovaStar Finan. In. NFI 284
Shell Transport & Trading SC SHEL 3,146 249 WPP Group WPP 942 Covane In. CVD 247
Rio Tinto RTP RIO 1,999 141 Kingsher KGF 894 Sierra Health Servies SIE 141
Unilever UL ULVR 1,487 130 Sottish & Southern SSE 740 Longs Drug Stores Corp. LDG 130
Cadbury Shweppes CSG CBRY 1,082 81 Man Group EMG 685 Extended Stay Ameria ESA 81
Barlays Bank BCS BARC 3,328 65 BAA pl BAA 968 Comstok Res. In. CRK 65
Sottish Power SPI SPW 1,241 60 Rolls Roye RR. 719 Oxford Industries OXM 60
Lloyds TSB Group LYG LLOY 3,499 55 Aviva pl AV. 981 Remington Iol & Gas REM 55
BT Group BTY BT.A 3,637 43 Compass Group CPG 1,011 Tetra Tehn. TTI 42
Smith & Newphew SNN SN. 611 39 Sabmiller SAB 611 Chekpoint Systems CKP 39
Imperial Chemial Industr. ICI ICI 336 28 EMI Group EMI 331 Haventys furniture Comp HVT 28
British Airways BAB BAY 678 27 Rentokil Initial RTO 654 Skehers USA SKX 27
Gallaher Group GLH GLH 524 26 Rexam REX 518 Sovran Self Storage SSS 26
Amersham AHM AHM 1,177 21 Next NXT 728 Florida East Coast Ind. FLA 21
Amvesap AVZ AVZ 1,134 20 Gus GUS 731 Applied Industrial Tehn. AIT 20
National Grid Transo NGG NGT 2,014 20 Boots Group BOOT 922 Russ Bernie & Co. In. RUS 19
Cable and Wireless CWP CW. 1,007 18 Rekitt Benkiser RB. 681 MMoran Exploration MMR 18
Reed Elsevier RUK REL 1,584 18 Xstrata XTA 763 Tennessee Valley Auth. TVC 18
Pearson PSO PSON 1,122 13 Smiths Group SMIN 692 Adv. Market Servies MKT 13
BSkyB BSY BSY 1,672 11 Sainsbury SBRY 865 Department 56 In. DFS 11
BOC Group BOX BOC 955 11 Hays HAS 658 Bukeye tehn. In. BKI 11
Imperial Tobao Group ITY IMT 961 10 Dixons Group DXNS 659 Criimi MAE Inorp CMM CMM 10
Duth stoks
KLM Royal Duth Airlines KLM KLM 189 52
Philips Eletronis PHIA PHG 1,623 458
Royal Duth RDA RD 2,065 987
Unilever UNIA UN 1,034 332
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Table 1: Pattern Preditions: Values Overlap vs. Non-Overlap
This table ontains trading pattern preditions for a seurity trading in two partially overlapping markets.
Based on a model that builds on Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and Admati and Peiderer (1988), we
determine values for volume, volatility, and market depth during the overlap and ompare them to non-
overlap values and we alulate the orrelation in order imbalane during the overlap. We study dierent
senarios. In the benhmark senario both markets are fully segmented; no trader has aess to the other
market. We label this senario 0 and depart from it in dierent diretions by allowing dierent types of
traders aess to the other market and by allowing large liquidity traders to time their trade. This leads to
senarios 1a, 1b, 2, and 3.
Senarios
0 1a 1b 2 3
Fully
Segmented
Markets
Allow Large
Liquidity
Traders to
Aess Other
Market
Allow
Informed
Traders to
Aess Other
Market
Allow Large
Liquidity
and Informed
Traders to
Aess Other
Market
Allow Large Liq-
uidity and In-
formed Traders
to Aess Other
Market and Allow
Large Liquidity
Traders to Time
their Trade
Panel A: Predited Value Overlap as ompared to Non-Overlap
Volume Unhanged Lower in at
least one mar-
ket
Higher
(< 21.82%)
Unpreditable Higher
b
Volatility Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher
Depth
a
(
 1
) Unhanged Lower in at
least one mar-
ket
Higher Unpreditable Higher
b
Correlation Or-
der Imbalane
Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive
Panel B: Numerial Example

Volume 0% -10% 20% 7% 91%
Volatility 33% 20% 60% 50% 45%
Depth
a
(
 1
) 0% -13% 6% -8% 52%
Correlation Or-
der Imbalane
0.50 0.67 0.53 0.71 0.79
a
: Note that higher values of  indiate lower market depth.
b
: These values have been alulated for the Nash equilibrium of both large liquidity traders trading during
the overlap. This is the equilibrium with lowest trading osts for both large liquidity traders.

: Values for the overlap as ompared to non-overlap for the speial ase when (i) all liquidity traders are of
equal size and (ii) the standard deviation of liquidity demand equals the standard deviation of the hange
in the seurity's true value (v).
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Table 2: Trade Statistis: Overlap and Full Day
This table presents trade statistis for home market and NYSE trading of all British and Duth stoks. Both
samples onsist of a full year of trade and quote data for both markets and intraday quotes on the exhange
rate. The British sample runs from November 2002 through Otober 2003; the Duth sample from July 1997
through June 1998. The averages have been alulated for ve-minute intervals.
5-minute Volume
(#Shares)
5-minute Re-
turn Volatility
(bp)
Quoted
Spread (bp)
Eetive
Spread (bp)
Home NYSE Home NYSE Home NYSE Home NYSE
Panel A: Overlap
1
st
Quintile UK Stoks 916,364 60,583 18.4 20.0 12.1 9.2 12.3 6.8
British Petroleum pl 663,253 97,980 17.0 25.4 9.2 6.4 8.9 4.5
Vodafone 3,224,708 132,679 20.7 20.3 22.3 13.5 21.2 8.7
HSBC Holdings 447,381 32,683 12.4 12.0 8.5 6.9 11.6 5.3
AstraZenea 71,793 21,824 19.2 19.1 9.4 9.6 10.0 7.9
GlaxoSmithKline 174,687 17,750 21.6 20.7 10.9 9.8 9.9 7.8
2
nd
Quintile UK Stoks 169,455 6,161 16.7 17.2 11.6 15.1 10.3 13.6
3
rd
Quintile UK Stoks 243,680 2,650 24.4 23.8 14.8 24.7 14.4 20.7
4
th
Quintile UK Stoks 98,870 1,848 29.3 30.3 24.6 37.0 27.6 33.8
5
th
Quintile UK Stoks 155,991 2,088 25.2 29.3 19.4 47.2 22.3 38.0
All Duth Stoks 120,897 50,339 36.3 35.7 25.5 48.6 23.3 32.0
KLM 32,897 10,535 44.1 41.0 36.2 82.9 32.5 57.7
Philips 123,180 37,511 42.2 39.4 25 44.2 27.6 32.7
Royal Duth 232,409 119,635 29.9 35.8 21.2 47.2 16.9 16.5
Unilever 95,103 33,675 28.8 26.6 19.6 19.9 16.3 21.1
Panel B: Full Day
1
st
Quintile UK Stoks 593,824 37,769 16.3 14.7 12.6 8.8 11.3 6.2
British Petroleum pl 403,646 59,914 15.1 16.3 9.8 6.4 8.5 4.3
Vodafone 2,120,701 82,516 18.1 16.3 22.4 13.1 20.3 8.2
HSBC Holdings 291,289 22,000 10.8 9.6 8.5 6.2 8.0 4.5
AstraZenea 44,360 13,163 17.6 15.2 10.6 9.0 9.8 7.2
GlaxoSmithKline 109,126 11,254 18.6 15.1 11.9 9.1 10.1 6.7
2
nd
Quintile UK Stoks 109,866 3,601 15.7 15.8 13.1 17.7 11.9 14.6
3
rd
Quintile UK Stoks 166,612 1,714 22.8 20.8 17.6 27.8 15.7 21.1
4
th
Quintile UK Stoks 64,298 1,133 29.6 29.0 31.1 44.5 26.5 35.3
5
th
Quintile UK Stoks 103,496 1,241 26.3 29.8 22.3 61.3 22.7 43.2
All Duth Stoks 73,247 30,363 27.3 26.7 25.2 41.8 18.9 18.5
KLM 19,706 5,929 30.5 26.2 36.5 66.4 28 31.7
Philips 77,149 23,609 33.4 27.3 25.5 37.7 18.3 14.5
Royal Duth 138,665 71,871 24.5 30.2 20.4 43.8 14.7 14.5
Unilever 57,467 20,044 20.9 23.1 18.4 19.2 14.4 13.2
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Table 3: Overlap vs. Non-Overlap: Volatility
This table ompares volatility during the overlap to volatility outside the overlap for both the home market and the NYSE. We alulate how
volatility in the home market hanges when the NYSE opens and we do the same for the NYSE when the home market loses. We use half-hour
intervals before and after the event. For the British sample, we repeat this proedure for volume-mathed single-listed stoks to ontrol for the
regular intraday pattern. Standard errors are alulated after removing interday variation through saling.
%-age Change Home Market on New York Open %-age Change New York on Home Market Close
Cross-Listed
Stoks
Control
Stoks
Dierene
Cross-Listed
and Control
Cross-Listed
Stoks
Control
Stoks
Dierene
Cross-Listed
and Control
Change  Change  Change  Change  Change  Change 
1
st
Quintile UK Stoks 93.4 4.5 49.5 4.4 43.9 6.3 -65.2 5.6 -41.3 4.8 -23.9 7.4
British Petroleum pl 101.7 10.0 56.7 9.4 45.1 13.7 -83.0 12.1 -31.3 9.5 -51.8 15.4
Vodafone 118.0 12.2 47.2 10.2 70.8 15.9 -24.8 10.0 -43.9 9.5 19.1 13.8
HSBC Holdings 105.9 9.8 48.5 11.0 57.4 14.8 -56.0 12.1 -33.3 12.4 -22.6 17.3
AstraZenea 78.4 9.4 61.7 9.1 16.7 13.1 -37.0 11.7 -44.8 9.9 7.7 15.4
GlaxoSmithKline 56.2 8.7 38.1 9.2 18.1 12.7 -125.4 15.9 -51.3 11.3 -74.1 19.5
2
nd
Quintile UK Stoks 55.7 4.4 52.8 4.5 3.0 6.3 -29.6 5.7 -47.9 5.4 18.3 7.8
3
rd
Quintile UK Stoks 58.7 4.5 54.9 5.0 3.9 6.7 -111.3 10.0 -60.2 6.9 -51.0 12.2
4
th
Quintile UK Stoks 49.1 5.1 43.1 4.6 6.0 6.9 -72.5 9.5 -38.7 5.7 -33.8 11.1
5
th
Quintile UK Stoks 56.4 4.7 36.9 4.9 19.6 6.8 -66.1 10.7 -33.2 6.2 -32.9 12.4
All Duth Stoks 70.7 10.4 -30.2 4.3
KLM 37.5 28.9 -45.7 10.2
Philips 51.6 13.8 -29.9 8.7
Royal Duth 155.4 20.5 -14.3 7.9
Unilever 91.2 16.3 -23.4 7.8
3
9
Table 4: Overlap vs. Non-Overlap: Volume
This table ompares volume during the overlap to volume outside the overlap for both the home market and the NYSE. We alulate how
volume in the home market hanges when the NYSE opens and we do the same for the NYSE when the home market loses. We use half-hour
intervals before and after the event. For the British sample, we repeat this proedure for volume-mathed single-listed stoks to ontrol for the
regular intraday pattern. Standard errors are alulated after removing interday variation through saling.
%-age Change Home Market on New York Open %-age Change New York on Home Market Close
Cross-Listed
Stoks
Control
Stoks
Dierene
Cross-Listed
and Control
Cross-Listed
Stoks
Control
Stoks
Dierene
Cross-Listed
and Control
Change  Change  Change  Change  Change  Change 
1
st
Quintile UK Stoks 81.9 2.6 39.2 2.8 42.7 3.8 -105.9 3.9 -18.3 2.4 -87.7 4.6
British Petroleum pl 102.0 5.4 49.2 6.7 52.8 8.6 -94.2 7.1 -17.3 4.7 -76.9 8.6
Vodafone 83.8 6.1 32.2 5.3 51.6 8.1 -98.0 10.5 -17.0 6.0 -80.9 12.0
HSBC Holdings 74.4 5.6 29.1 6.9 45.2 8.9 -78.8 7.7 -11.8 5.9 -67.0 9.7
AstraZenea 74.2 6.1 49.0 6.1 25.2 8.6 -141.5 9.5 -15.6 4.4 -125.8 10.5
GlaxoSmithKline 72.9 5.8 35.8 5.8 37.1 8.2 -115.8 7.9 -29.7 6.1 -86.1 10.0
2
nd
Quintile UK Stoks 54.5 2.7 57.8 3.4 -3.3 4.4 -144.9 5.7 -16.1 2.9 -128.7 6.4
3
rd
Quintile UK Stoks 47.1 2.8 47.3 2.9 -0.2 4.0 -194.5 12.6 -32.5 4.1 -162.0 13.2
4
th
Quintile UK Stoks 45.6 3.7 46.2 3.5 -0.6 5.1 -215.9 12.9 -15.7 4.0 -200.2 13.6
5
th
Quintile UK Stoks 46.2 3.3 54.8 4.2 -8.7 5.3 -216.9 12.9 -20.2 4.7 -196.6 13.7
All Duth Stoks 67.9 3.6 -29.0 2.8
KLM 76.9 9.7 -45.5 7.6
Philips 51.0 6.2 -35.4 5.5
Royal Duth 80.0 5.9 -23.8 4.0
Unilever 67.9 3.6 -32.5 4.9
4
0
Table 5: Overlap vs. Non-Overlap: Eetive Spread
This table ompares the eetive spread during the overlap to the eetive spread outside the overlap for both the home market and the NYSE.
We alulate how the eetive spread in the home market hanges when the NYSE opens and we do the same for the NYSE when the home
market loses. We use half-hour intervals before and after the event. For the British sample, we repeat this proedure for volume-mathed
single-listed stoks to ontrol for the regular intraday pattern. Standard errors are alulated after removing interday variation through saling.
%-age Change Home Market on New York Open %-age Change New York on Home Market Close
Cross-Listed
Stoks
Control
Stoks
Dierene
Cross-Listed
and Control
Cross-Listed
Stoks
Control
Stoks
Dierene
Cross-Listed
and Control
Change  Change  Change  Change  Change  Change 
1
st
Quintile UK Stoks 0.4 1.1 5.0 1.3 -4.6 1.7 7.2 1.8 -7.2 1.7 14.4 2.4
British Petroleum pl 0.6 2.7 3.2 3.0 -2.6 4.0 2.4 3.5 -4.5 3.5 6.9 5.0
Vodafone 1.5 1.3 -0.6 2.0 2.1 2.4 12.2 3.6 -9.5 3.7 21.6 5.2
HSBC Holdings 1.8 2.2 4.8 2.9 -3.0 3.7 2.8 4.0 -2.6 3.8 5.4 5.5
AstraZenea 1.7 3.3 17.7 3.7 -16.0 5.0 14.1 4.2 -8.7 3.7 22.7 5.6
GlaxoSmithKline -2.4 2.5 1.8 2.6 -4.2 3.6 4.6 4.2 -10.1 3.7 14.7 5.5
2
nd
Quintile UK Stoks -1.1 1.3 2.5 1.6 -3.6 2.0 25.5 1.9 -3.1 1.8 28.7 2.6
3
rd
Quintile UK Stoks 6.9 1.5 3.6 1.5 3.3 2.2 13.0 1.9 -8.9 2.1 21.9 2.9
4
th
Quintile UK Stoks -2.3 1.6 4.4 1.6 -6.7 2.3 16.8 2.2 -9.7 2.0 26.5 2.9
5
th
Quintile UK Stoks 4.4 1.5 -4.1 1.8 8.5 2.3 19.9 2.1 -4.4 2.1 24.3 3.0
All Duth Stoks 3.5 1.3 0.4 1.5
KLM 3.9 2.9 -3.2 3.3
Philips -0.7 2.3 -1.1 3.0
Royal Duth 7.9 2.2 0.5 2.3
Unilever 3.5 2.7 11.4 3.3
4
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Table 6: Correlation Order Imbalane aross Markets
This table presents orrelations of order imbalane aross markets based on ve-minute intervals. Panel A
reports these orrelations for three types of intervals: (i) order-splitting intervals, where the market snapshot
at the start of the interval shows an opportunity for order-splitting; (ii) arbitrage intervals, where the same
snapshot shows an arbitrage opportunity; and (iii) the remaining intervals. Panel B reports the orrelations
for order imbalane innovations, whih are dened as the dierene between the observed order imbalane
and its predited value. These preditions are based on a vetor-autoregressive model for order imbalane
in both markets with lagged returns as explanatory variables.
Order-Splitting
Opportunity
Arbitrage
Opportunity
Other
Corr 

#Obsv Corr 

#Obsv Corr 

#Obsv
Panel A: Correlation Order Imbalane aross Markets
1
st
Quintile UK Stoks 0.23 0.03 2,849 0.02 0.27 14 0.15 0.02 20,672
British Petroleum pl 0.23 0.04 575 1.00 0.71 2 0.21 0.02 4,130
Vodafone 0.17 0.07 178 -0.30 0.35 8 0.14 0.01 4,521
HSBC Holdings 0.15 0.02 1,793 -0.58 0.50 4 0.13 0.02 2,910
AstraZenea 0.29 0.08 144 0.00 0.00 0 0.12 0.01 4,563
GlaxoSmithKline 0.30 0.08 159 0.00 0.00 0 0.17 0.01 4,548
2
nd
Quintile UK Stoks 0.06 0.05 1,465 0.09 0.24 32 0.09 0.02 22,036
3
rd
Quintile UK Stoks 0.10 0.03 1,327 -0.28 0.15 54 0.08 0.01 22,150
4
th
Quintile UK Stoks 0.07 0.03 4,650 -0.17 0.17 225 0.06 0.01 18,647
5
th
Quintile UK Stoks 0.06 0.02 2,191 0.03 0.01 1,243 0.04 0.01 20,089
All Duth Stoks 0.26 0.05 6,689 0.24 0.05 730
KLM 0.19 0.03 1,566 0.21 0.06 255
Philips 0.19 0.02 1,704 0.20 0.08 144
Royal Duth 0.40 0.02 1,712 0.37 0.08 152
Unilever 0.24 0.02 1,707 0.16 0.07 179
Panel B: Correlation Order Imbalane Innovation, i.e. Controlling for \Mirostruture" Dynamis
1
st
Quintile UK Stoks 0.25 0.05 2,839 0.43 0.22 14 0.15 0.02 20,183
British Petroleum pl 0.24 0.04 572 1.00 0.71 2 0.21 0.02 3,990
Vodafone 0.42 0.07 178 0.20 0.35 8 0.13 0.01 4,514
HSBC Holdings 0.16 0.02 1,786 0.93 0.50 4 0.11 0.02 2,828
AstraZenea 0.19 0.08 144 0.00 0.00 0 0.13 0.02 4,390
GlaxoSmithKline 0.24 0.08 159 0.00 0.00 0 0.18 0.01 4,461
2
nd
Quintile UK Stoks 0.08 0.03 1,463 -0.29 0.20 32 0.09 0.02 21,571
3
rd
Quintile UK Stoks -0.08 0.07 1,326 -0.15 0.18 54 0.08 0.01 21,551
4
th
Quintile UK Stoks 0.08 0.02 4,575 -0.13 0.18 225 0.05 0.01 18,318
5
th
Quintile UK Stoks 0.04 0.01 2,187 0.05 0.02 1,241 0.04 0.01 19,472
All Duth Stoks 0.25 0.05 6,620 0.23 0.05 776
KLM 0.19 0.03 1,563 0.12 0.06 249
Philips 0.16 0.02 1,682 0.33 0.08 159
Royal Duth 0.40 0.02 1,688 0.31 0.08 171
Unilever 0.24 0.02 1,687 0.15 0.07 197
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Figure 1: Intraday Patterns Volatility and Volume for Top Quintile British stoks. This gure
depits the intraday patterns in volatility (top two graphs) and volume (bottom two graphs) for the ve
British stoks that generate most volume at the NYSE. The line with the lled dots represents the pattern as
estimated for these stoks and the one with open dots represents the pattern for volume-mathed single-listed
ontrol stoks. On the left hand side are the graphs for the home market and on the right hand side are
the graphs for the NYSE. 95% ondene intervals have been alulated after removing interday variation
through saling.
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Figure 2: Intraday Patterns Liquidity for Top Quintile British stoks. This gure depits the
intraday patterns in quoted spread (top two graphs), eetive spread (middle two graphs), and Kyle-
(bottom two graphs) for the ve British stoks that generate most volume at the NYSE. The line with
the lled dots represents the pattern as estimated for these stoks and the line with open dots represents
the pattern for volume-mathed single-listed ontrol stoks. On the left hand side are the graphs for the
home market and on the right hand side are the graphs for the NYSE. 95% ondene intervals have been
alulated after removing interday variation through saling.
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Figure 3: Histogram Log Midquote Dierentials Aross the Home Market and the NYSE.
The top graph ontains a histogram for the relative dierene between the New York midquote in British
pounds and the British midquote during the overlapping period. The bottom graph ontains this histogram
for Duth stoks. Both graphs are based ve-minute snapshots for all stoks in the sample.
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